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COMMENTARY
"THE SUPREME COURT AS A LEGISLATURE":
A DISSENT
Raoul Bergert
Unlike his zealous brethren who would not have the Found-
ers rule us from their graves, who deride resort to the "original
intention" to ascertain the limits of delegated power,' Professor
Geoffrey Hazard would derive "the premise that the Court is a
legislature" from the Constitution.' That the Court "formulate[s]
general rules of law" reflecting the "value[s] held by its members,"
that it formulates "policy", that is, "the specific social purposes
that a legislative body seeks to fulfill through its enactments," 3 is
undeniable. Nor is it questionable that in diverse common law
areas such as torts and contracts, courts traditionally have been
left to make "policy," but always subject to overruling by the legis-
lature. Even that traditional power has its limits, as Justice Holmes
remarked:
[J]udges do and must legislate, but they can do so only intersti-
tially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A
common-law judge could not say I think the doctrine of consid-
eration a bit of historical nonsense and shall not enforce it .... 4
At issue is not, therefore, whether judges make "policy" but
whether they are authorized to supplant the policy choices of the legis-
lature by their own.5
t Member, Illinois and District of Columbia bars. A.B. 1932, University of Cincinnati;
J.D. 1935, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1938, Harvard University; LL.D. 1975, Univer-
sity of Cincinnati; LL.D. 1978, University of Michigan.
' Brest, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977 (Book Review), at 10; Cover, Book
Review, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 1978, at 26-27; Miller, Book Review, Washington
Post, Nov. 13, 1977, § E, at 5; Murphy, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 1752 (1978).
2 Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1978).
3 Id. at 2.
' Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (dissenting opinion). Even in
the adjudication of common law cases, the norm was to leave "novel or unique" changes to
the legislature, not "to replace a durable impersonal body of common law principles with
intuitive individual notions of justice in a given case." G.E. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL
TRADITION 277 (1976).
' Apparently Hazard does not argue that the Court may supplant the policy changes
of the Framers.
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Hazard is not one to shut his eyes to the formidable obstacles
that loom before him. He recognizes that the Constitution "distin-
guishes [judicial] power from 'legislative Powers,'" that it "refers
to 'Cases' and 'Controversies' in 'Law and Equity' ... , terms that
unequivocally suggest an adjudicative tribunal in the mold of En-
glish antecedents and state counterparts." 6 Neither knew of a
judicial power to reject the authorized policy decisions of a legisla-
ture. The Court's contemporaneous constructions, Hazard ob-
serves, rejecting advisory opinions and the imposition of adminis-
trative responsibilities, "plainly indicate that the Supreme Court
thought itself to be a court" and "has never [explicitly] departed
from this interpretation." 7 For a "different view" one "must rely
almost entirely on inference," but he asserts that "there is an
evidentiary basis for inference." 8 I beg to differ.
To begin with judicial review in general, Hazard notes that
the Convention did not "explicitly confer on the judiciary the au-
thority to declare legislation invalid"; its "silence in [this] respect is
now taken as an implicit but unmistakable recognition of the
power of judicial review." 9 "Silence" is a slender reed on which
to rest so great a power,10 particularly when it departs from "the
mold of English antecedents." I Elsewhere I have shown that the
Framers employed language which they considered conferred the
power of judicial review. 2 Here it suffices to note that Edward
Corwin, whose view my own research confirmed, concluded that
the Framers contemplated judicial review, and that "on no other
feature of the Constitution with reference to which there has been
any considerable debate is the view of the Convention itself better
s Hazard, supra note 2, at 2 n.4 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2 n.5. Hazard would soften the impact of these rejections on the ground that
"such invitations [by Congress] surely would not have been extended if there were not
good reason for thinking that the Court had authority to accept them." Id. at 6. But the
Court has the last word in these matters; as Hazard reminds us, "the Court could well say
'[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the [judiciary] to say what the law is.' "Id. at
7. Activists eagerly welcome the Court's assumption of dubious power over segregation and
suffrage, although it runs counter to the Framers' choices. I would attach more weight to
decisions that renounce power, particularly when they are contemporaneous constructions.
And if "advisory opinions" are indeed not 'judicial" in nature, then Congress could no
more add them to the jurisdiction of the courts than Congress could add to the "original
jurisdiction" of the Supreme Court. See text accompanying notes 66-68 infra.
' Hazard, supra note 2, at 3.
9 Id. at 3-4.
10 See text accompanying note 73 infra.
1 Hazard, supra note 2, at 2 n.4.
12 R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 198-284 (1969).
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attested." 13 True, Judge Learned Hand and Professors Ar-
chibald Cox and Leonard Levy regard the evidence on this score
as inconclusive,1 4 a view that challenges the validity of judicial re-
view altogether, but the Framers were scarcely "silent."
"[A]t the time," Hazard states, there was "no settled view of
the concept and proper scope of judicial review." 15 There was
however a quite clear conception of its limits, as a brief historical
survey will show. Blackstone declared in mid-eighteenth century
that courts could not curb Parliament's omnipotent power.' In
the struggle to throw off the bonds of Parliament, the colonists
invoked Coke's dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case."7 But the fact re-
mains that judicial review had not taken root in the mother coun-
try. The few pre-1787 state cases in which the power was asserted
proceeded for violations of express constitutional provisions, such
as trial by jury. 8 Not one represents a take-over of legislative
policymaking. Even so, a few cases excited stormy disapproval
leading to removal proceedings,' 9 because the Founders were at-
tached to legislative paramountcy, the consequence of the fact that
judges and governors were thrust upon them by the Crown
whereas they elected their own darling assemblies.2 0  Hence
Madison stated in The Federalist, "[i]n republican government, the
legislative authority necessarily predominates." 2' Understandably
" Id. at 105 (citing E. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 12-13 (1914)). See
R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 47-119.
1' A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 12-16 (1976);
L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (1958); Levy, Judicial Review, History, and Democracy: An
Introduction, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 2-3 (L. Levy ed. 1967). Judge
Hand concluded that the power of judicial review is "not a logical deduction from the
structure of the Constitution but only a practical condition upon its successful operation"
(L. HAND, supra, at 15) because he was "unwilling to rest on the historical evidence." A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 46 (1962).
15 Hazard, supra note 2, at 4.
1 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91.
[N]otwithstanding what was attributed to Lord Coke in Bonham's Case, 8 Rep.
115, 118 a, the omnipotence of Parliament over the common law was absolute,
even against common right and reason. The actual and practical security for
English liberty against legislative tyranny was the power of a free public opinion
represented by the Commons.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
17 8 Coke 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610).
"I Berger, "'Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 13-17 (1979).
'9 R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 38, 40, 42.
20 JAMES WILSON, Of Government, in I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 292-93 (R.G.
McCloskey ed. 1967). As late as 1791, Justice Wilson declared it was "high time" to regard
executive and judges equally with the legislative as representatives of the people. Id. at 293.
21 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 U. Madison), at 338 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). Justice Brandeis
referred to the deep-seated conviction of the English and American people that they "must
[Vol. 64:988
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Hamilton felt constrained to assure the Ratifiers that of the three
branches "the judiciary is next to nothing." 22  From "next to
nothing" it is not easy to blow up a conception of judicial
policymaking that could displace that of the legislature. Indeed,
Hazard handsomely acknowledges that "any such overt role for
the judiciary" in "lawmaking" was "then, as now, politically con-
troversial. An explicit provision on the subject would have added
to the burden of political initiative that the proponents of the
Constitution well knew was already formidable."23  More crudely,
advocacy of a broad judicial role might have doomed the Con-
stitution altogether, particularly when exercised over states jealous
for their own prerogatives. To read expansive judicial review into
the Constitution on the theory that there was a conspiracy to
make no disclosure would undercut the effectiveness of ratifica-
tion, for there is no ratification of the undisclosed.24
Today it is unfashionable to take account of the separation of
powers, and no reference thereto is made by Hazard. But it
played a central role in the thinking of the Founders on this very
issue. Thus Chief Justice Hutchinson of Massachusetts stated in
1767 that "the Judge should never be the Legislator: Because then
the Will of the Judge would be the Law: and this tends to a State
of Slavery." 25  Such sentiments were made explicit in John
Adams' 1780 Massachusetts Constitution which provided "The
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers"
to the end "it may be a 'government of laws and not of men.' "26
These sentiments derived from Montesquieu, who was to be the
oracle of the several constitutional conventions and who had writ-
ten that if Judges were to be the Legislators, the "life and liberty
of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control."27  Such
look to representative assemblies for the protection of their liberties." Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 294-95 (1926) (dissenting opinion). For a similar view expressed in the
Convention by Elbridge Gerry, see text accompanying note 48 infra.
"- THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), at 504 n.* (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (quoting 1
MONTFSQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAws, bk. 11, ch. 6, at 185 (Philadelphia 1802)).
22 Hazard, supra note 2, at 4.
24 See Bennecke v. Insurance Co., 105 U.S. 355, 360 (1881); Owings v. Hull, 34 U.S. (9
Pet.) 607, 628-30 (1835).
25 R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 307 (1977) (quoting Charge to the Grand
Jury by the Chief Justice, Quincy's Mass. Rep. 234 (1767) (emphasis in original)).
26 R. BERGER, supra note 25, at 250 n.5, 290 (quoting MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art.
XXX). Madison stated in the First Congress, "if there is a principle in our Constitution ...
more sacred than another, it is that which separates the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
powers." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 581 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (print bearing running title
"History of Congress").
27 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 22, bk. 11, ch. 6, at 181.
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were the suppositions the Founders brought to fashioning the
novel judicial review.
When Hazard reads "Hamilton's famous defense of judicial
review in No. 78 of The Federalist" as "ascribing a broad meaning
to a concept whose connotation had been unresolved at the draft-
ing stage [because "controversial" and perilous]," 28 he overlooks a
group of remarks by Hamilton that run strongly counter to that
interpretation.29 Echoing Montesquieu, he stated "'there is no
liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legisla-
tive and executive powers.' "30 Having divorced judging from
legislation, he hardly contemplated that legislating would be taken
over by the judiciary. Instead he wrote that courts may not, "on
the pretence of a repugnancy, ... substitute their own pleasure to
the constitutional intentions of the legislature." 31 That is, they
may not intrude within the boundaries of legislative power. Hamil-
ton also assured the Ratifiers that judges could be impeached for
"deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature. ' 32
However "broad" Hamilton's view of judicial review may have
been, it plainly did not encompass exercise of legislative power.
By these statements Hamilton sought to allay fears of an innova-
tive power that was admittedly "politically controversial," fears
which might wreck ratification altogether. He cannot now be read
to endorse a view which he in fact disavowed.
Nor would I concur in Hazard's view that the connotations of
judicial review were "unresolved at the drafting stage." To the
contrary, all the Founders' remarks about judicial review were in a
narrow frame, referring solely to the policing of constitutional
limits; the solitary attempt to have the judiciary participate in
legislative policymaking was unequivocally rejected.3 3  For exam-
ple, James Wilson said that Congress may be "kept within its pre-
scribed bounds, by the interposition of the judicial depart-
28 Hazard, supra note 2, at 4.
29 Jefferson regarded The Federalist as "evidence of the general opinion of those who
framed ... the Constitution." C. ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION
52 (1964) (quoting Resolution of Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia on "Politi-
cal Science" (Mar. 4, 1825), reprinted in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1112 (S. Padover ed.
1943)). Edward Corwin concurred: "It cannot be reasonably doubted that Hamilton was
here [judicial review], as at other points, endeavoring to reproduce the matured conclu-
sions of the Convention itself." E. CORWIN, supra note 13, at 44.
30 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), at 504 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (quoting MON-
TESQUIEU, supra note 22, bk. 11, ch. 6, at 181).
31 Id. at 507.
32 THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton), at 526-27 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
" See text accompanying notes 45-52 infra.
992 [Vol. 64:988
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ment." " The courts, said Oliver Ellsworth, were a "check" if
Congress should "overleap their limits," that is, "make a law which
the constitution does not authorise." 35 Long before Marbury v.
Madison, John Marshall stated in the Virginia Ratification Conven-
tion (1788) that judges could declare void "a law not warranted by
any of the powers enumerated."36  Hamilton stressed that the
courts were to serve as "bulwarks of a limited Constitution against
legislative encroachments." 3  But "within those limits," Madison
said, there were "discretionary powers," and the exercise of that
discretion was for the branch to whom it was confided. 8 This
differentiation was clearly spelled out by Justice James Iredell,
who had anticipated Hamilton in explaining the basis for judicial
review.3 In Ware v. Hylton (1796)," ° he declared, "[tlhe power of
the legislatures is limited" by the several constitutions: 41
Beyond these limitations, ... their acts are void, because they
are not warranted by the authority given. But within them, ....
they are in all cases obligatory ... because ... the legislatures
only exercise a discretion expressly confided to them by the
constitution of their country .... It is a discretion no more con-
trolable ... by a court of justice, than a judicial determination is
by them, neither department having any right to encroach on
the exclusive province of the other, in order to rectify any error
in principle, which it may suppose the other has committed. 42
In an early landmark decision laying claim to the power of
judicial review, Judge Henry, of the General Court of Virginia,
declared:
14 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 417 (2d ed. Washington 1836).
35 2 id. at 198.
36 3 id. at 503.
"I THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), at 508 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
38 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (print bearing running title
"History of Congress"). "The Legislative powers," Madison stated, "are vested in Congress,
and are to be exercised by them uncontrolled by any other department, except the Con-
stitution has qualified it otherwise." Id. at 463. Justice Field declared for a unanimous
Court: "When once it is established that Congress possesses the power to pass an act, our
province ends with its construction . The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603
(1889). Control of executive discretion, for example, lies beyond the judicial function. See
Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 169-70 (1803).
" See R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 82-83 (quoting Letter from James Iredell to Richard
Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), reprinted in LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 172-73
(G. McRee ed. 1858) (emphasis in original)).
40 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199 (1796).
" Id. at 266.
42 Id. (emphasis added).
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The judiciary, from the nature of the office ... could
never be designed to determine upon the equity, necessity, or
usefulness of a law; that would amount to an express interfer-
ing with the legislative branch .... [N]ot being chosen im-
mediately by the people, nor being accountable to them, ...
they do not, and ought not, to represent the people in framing
or repealing any law.
43
James Bradley Thayer and Judge Learned Hand were therefore
on solid ground when they emphasized that the courts were con-
fined to policing constitutional boundaries in order to insure that
the departments did not "overleap" their bounds."
Hazard would draw some intimations to the contrary from
the Framers' action on the Council of Revision. Consideration of
his argument requires a rather full statement of the historical
facts. Edmund Randolph proposed in the Convention that the
President, "and a convenient number of the National Judiciary,
ought to compose a council of revision" to examine every act of
Congress and by its dissent to constitute a veto.45  Arguing for
judicial participation in the veto, George Mason recognized that
judges already
could declare an unconstitutional law void. But with regard to
every law however unjust, oppressive or pernicious, which did
not come plainly under this description, they would be under
the necessity as Judges to give it a free course. He wished the
further use to be made of the Judges, of giving aid in prevent-
ing every improper law. 46
A similar differentiation was drawn by James Wilson:
Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be
destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the
Judges in refusing to give them effect. Let them have a share in
the Revisionary [veto] power [in order to "counteract"] the im-
proper views of the Legislature. 47
13 Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 47 (1793). For remarks to the same effect
by Elbridge Gerry in the Convention, see text accompanying note 48 infra. See also note 57
infra.
44 L. HAND, supra note 14, at 31, 66; Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doc-
trine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129, 135 (1893).
15 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (1911).
46 2 id. at 78.
47 2 id. at 73.
[Vol. 64:988994
COMMENTARY
This proposal was rejected for reasons that unmistakably spell out
the exclusion of the judiciary from even a share in policymaking.
Elbridge Gerry, one of the most vigorous advocates of judicial re-
view, opposed judicial participation in the Council:
It was quite foreign from the nature of ye. office to make them
judges of the policy of public measures ....
... It was making Statesmen of the Judges; and setting
them up as the guardians of the Rights of the people. He relied
for his part on the Representatives of the people as the guar-
dians of their Rights & interests. It was making the Expositors
of the Laws, the Legislators which ought never to be done.48
Nathaniel Gorham saw no "advantage of employing the Judges in
this way. As Judges they are not to be presumed to possess any
peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of public measures." 49
Charles Pinckney also "opposed the interference of the Judges in
the Legislative business." 50 Rufus King opposed judicial partici-
pation on the ground that as "the Judges must interpret the Laws
they ought not to be legislators." 51 Roger Sherman "disapproved
of Judges meddling in politics and parties." 2
Hazard's efforts to diminish the force of these statements are
unpersuasive:
It is of course true that the debate in the Constitutional Con-
vention sought to distinguish the power to veto legislation from
the power to find legislation unconstitutional in an adjudica-
tion.... But then as now the distinction could not be clearly
drawn. Moreover, the political consideration supporting the two
concepts is the same-fear of pernicious laws. 53
For the latter statement he cites George Mason. But Mason plainly
distinguished between an "unconstitutional law" and one that was
48 id. at 97-98; 2 id. at 75.
4' 2 id. at 73. Such views are mirrored in the opinion of Justice James Iredell, who led
the fight for ratification in North Carolina: "These are considerations of policy, considera-
tions of extreme magnitude, and certainly entirely incompetent to the examination and
decision of a court of justice." Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 260 (1796). Almost one
hundred years later, Justice Brewer explained: "The courts ... make no laws, they estab-
lish no policy, they never enter into the domain of public action. They do not govern."
The Movement of Coercion, Address by Justice Brewer, New York State Bar Association
(Jan. 1893), quoted in E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT at xxv (1934).
50 2 id. at 298.
11 lid. at 108.
52 2 id. at 300.
'3 Hazard, supra note 2, at 4 n.13 (citations omitted).
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"oppressive or pernicious" but not unconstitutional and to which
the judges must give a "free course." It was for that reason that
he desired judicial interposition at the legislative stage to prevent
a law that was constitutional but "improper." Wilson underscored
that "Laws may be unjust ... and yet not be so unconstitutional as
to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect." The Found-
ers, we have seen, clearly understood by an "unconstitutional law"
one which "overleapt" the "limits" of the delegated authority. As
Iredell made clear, they appreciated the difference between a law
that went "beyond" such "limitations" and one, however "unwise"
that "was within them." The latter, as both Madison and Iredell
held, was not "controlable" by the judiciary. Where Hazard sows
doubt I find a "clearly drawn" distinction: Judicial participation in
a presidential veto at the enacting stage bears no resemblance
whatever to adjudication of a "case or controversy" respecting an
enacted statute. The distinction between legislation and adjudica-
tion could hardly be more clearly drawn.
Against this factual background Hazard's version of "one
["significant"] argument against the proposed Council was that its
function could be performed by the judiciary in the course of ad-
judication "54 obliterates the very distinction the Framers so clearly
drew. For both Mason and Wilson urged judicial participation in
the Council precisely because judges could not in adjudication re-
fuse effect to "pernicious" but constitutional laws. Their jurisdic-
tion was limited to unconstitutional laws; it did not extend to laws
that were merely impolitic.
Next Hazard argues that though "the Convention did not
adopt the proposal for a Council of Revision ... neither did it
explicitly confer on the judiciary the authority to declare legisla-
tion invalid." 55 From this he would infer "that the Convention,
in implicitly affirming the legitimacy of judicial review, also im-
plicitly affirmed the version of judicial review that tended toward
the function of a Council of Revision." 5  This errs on two
counts: (1) the records show that the Founders explicitly con-
templated judicial review and that it would be confined to policing
constitutional limits; and (2) they categorically rejected judicial par-
ticipation in policymaking at the legislative stage by barring them
from the Council. That which was explicitly rejected cannot have
been implicitly adopted. To regard "[t]he action of the Conven-
51 Id. at 3.
5 Id.
56 Id. at 4.
[Vol. 64:988996
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tion regarding the Council of Revision and judicial review ...
simply as a postponement of the issue of the judiciary's function
in lawmaking" 57 simply does not square with the historical facts.
Hamilton's remarks confirm that judicial "usurpations on the au-
thority of the legislature" were out of bounds.
Hazard states that the Judiciary Act of 1789 provision for
"appellate review over lower federal courts" read "along with that
concerning review of state court decisions leads compellingly to
the inference that there was similar authority to pass upon the
validity of legislative enactments." 58  Hazard concludes that this,
"empowered the Supreme Court to act as a Council of Revision so
far as concerns maintaining the legal structure of federalism." 59
He notes that:
[Q]uestions of "validity," [imply] nothing more than a power to
compare the text of the Constitution with the text of the subor-
dinate legal authority and to nullify the latter when it is dis-
crepant with the former. But a study of M'Culloch v. Maryland
... suggests that the power involves a decisional process going
beyond analysis of texts.60
I would maintain that no "decisional process" can transform the
power to examine "validity" of a state enactment into power to
displace the state's policy making within its constitutional bounds.
Moreover, the "decisional process" in McCulloch did not go
beyond sustaining Congress' choice of means to effectuate its dele-
gated powers. The test of "validity" was simply stated by Lee in
the Virginia Ratification Convention: "When a question arises
with respect to the legality of any power," the question will be, "Is
it enumerated in the constitution? ... It is otherwise arbitrary and
unconstitutional.""' Nor can comfort be drawn either from the
Act of 1789 or McCulloch for displacement of state policy making.
The powerful attachment to states rights, soon to be expressed in
the tenth amendment, the jealousy of encroachment by the re-
Id. Judge St. George Tucker, one of the earliest commentators on the Constitution
and subsequently promoted to the Virginia Court of Appeals, quoted Vattel: the legislature
"'ought to consider the fundamental laws as sacred, if the nation has not in express terms
given them power to change them.'" Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 75 (1793)
(emphasis partially omitted). Of the courts he stated their duty is "declaring what the law
is, not making a new law" (id. at 96), much less "to change" the "fundamental law."
58 Hazard, supra note 2, at 5 (emphasis added).
59 Id.
o Id. at 5 n.18.
61 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 34, at 192 (emphasis in original).
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mote federal government,6 2 repels the view that what was with-
held from the Court vis-a-vis Congress was cheerfully surrendered
to the Court as against the states.
To round out his historical discussion, Hazard turns to Mar-
bury v. Madison 13 and concludes that while it "may not sustain the
proposition that the Supreme Court is a legislative body ... it cer-
tainly sustains the broadest claims of authority ever made by or on
behalf of the Supreme Court." 64 True it is that it "held invalid a
statutory enactment of Congress-the most sovereign expression
of the legislative function," and "asserted its authority to adjudge
the legality of actions taken by officials of the Executive." 6 5 When
we look behind the "measured dicta" to what was actually decided,
Marbury emphatically does not illustrate "authority ... to declare
the law beyond what the Legislature has said it is." 66  The statute
sought to enlarge the "original jurisdiction" conferred on the
Court and thus was "invalid" in the sense understood by the
Founders. Marshall himself in the Virginia Ratification Conven-
tion had stated the consequences if Congress were to "go beyond
the delegated powers .... If they were to make a law not war-
ranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered
by the judges as an infringement of the constitution .... They
would declare it void." 67  No power to alter the delegation made
to the Court in the Constitution was granted to Congress, and
when it added to the Court's "original jurisdiction" it "overleapt"
its "limits" and infringed the Constitution. This was what "invalid-
ity" meant to the Framers, and it set the pattern for better than
150 years-review confined to nay-saying, what Justice Field
called the "negative power" of the Court.68  It remained for the
Warren Court to make "the broadest claims of authority ever
made," to initiate policy in spite of the contrary choices made by
62 R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 9, 32-33, 260-63. See H. ADAMS, JOHN RANDOLPH 18, 38
(1883); 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 34, at 240, 260-61, 352, 415; 3 id. at 59-60, 385-86; 4 id. at
300; M. FARRAND, supra note 45, at 345, 445, 500, 530; 2 id. at 386; Speech by Alexander
Hamilton, New York Assembly, First Speech on the Address of the Legislature to Gover-
nor George Clinton's Message (Jan. 19, 1787), reprinted in THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON II (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962).
63 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
64 Hazard, supra note 2, at 7 (emphasis added).
65 Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 7 n.24.
67 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 34, at 503.
68 R. BERGER, supra note 25, at 305 (quoting Letter from Justice Stephen Field to the
Supreme Court (Oct. 12, 1897), reprinted in 168 U.S. 713, 717 (1897)).
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the Framers. As Professor Archibald Cox, a commentator sym-
pathetic to the Warren Court, observed, "where the older activist
decisions [e.g. Lochner v. New York 6 merely blocked legislative ini-
tiatives, the decisions of the 1950's and 1960'sforced changes in the
established legal order," a revolutionary departure from the
judicial role conceived in Marbury.
Professor Hazard concludes that "[tihe argument that legally
the Court is not a legislative body is thus at least legally debatable.
Perhaps even those who would most narrowly define the Court
would concede that their position is not textually demonstra-
ble."71  This erroneously shifts the burden of proof. He himself
recognizes that the text "unequivocally suggest[s] an adjudicative
tribunal in the mold of English antecedents," 7 2 which knew no
judicial displacement of legislative policy. Consequently, as Chief
Justice Marshall held, "an opinion which is ... to establish a prin-
ciple never before recognized, should be expressed in plain and
explicit terms," 73 a rule peculiarly pertinent to a claim of constitu-
tional power. Under our system of limited delegations, the legality
of a claimed power may always be challenged by Lee's test: "Is it
enumerated in the Constitution? ... It is otherwise arbitrary and un-
constitutional." 74
The fact, so conveniently overlooked today, is that the Ameri-
can people, in the words of Elbridge Gerry, relied "on the Rep-
resentatives of the people as the guardians of their Rights & in-
terests."75  The call on the Court to take over that role is made
by those, as Hazard's Yale colleague, Professor Joseph Bishop has
69 198 U.S. 45 (1904).
7' R. BERGER, supra note 25, at 428 app. (emphasis added) (quoting Cox, The New Di-
mensions of Constitutional Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REV. 791, 802 (1976)). "The fact that
powers long have been unexercised well may call for close scrutiny as to whether they exist
.United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647 (1950).
7' Hazard, supra note 2, at 8.
72 Id. at 2 n.4.
73 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 165 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693).
74 See text accompanying note 61 supra. Justice Story wrote:
Nor should it ever be lost sight of, that the government of the United States is
one of limited and enumerated powers, and that a departure from the true
import and sense of its powers is pro tanto the establishment of a new constitu-
tion. It is doing for the people what they have not chosen to do for themselves.
It is usurping the functions of a legislator, and deserting those of an expounder
of the law. Arguments drawn from impolicy or inconvenience ought here to be
of no weight.
I J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 426, at 325-26
(5th ed. 1891).
" See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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written, who "obviously have no faith whatever in the wisdom or
the will of the great majority of the people who are opposed to
them. They are doing everything possible to have those problems
resolved by a small minority in the courts and the bureaucracy." 76
76 Bishop, What is a Liberal-Who is a Conservative?, 62 COMMENTARY, September 1976, at
47. See generally R. BERGER, supra note 25, at 313 (quoting A. Cox, supra note 14, at 34).
